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элементах. В появившихся новых – заметна модернизация куль-
товой практики и организационного устройства;
• выявленные особенности объединений альтернативного 
православия в сравнении с церковно-каноническими образова-
ниями, стали основой  для  определения их социально-функцио-
нальных характеристик.
Большой акцент делается на рассмотрение единства и разде-
лений православия в контексте изучения межрелигиозных и го-
сударственно-конфессиональных отношений. Сформулированы 
положения в качестве оснований для правильного понимания 
представителями государственно-административных и право-
вых инстанций причин и мотивов появляющихся в православии 
альтернативных структур, выработки соответствующих оценок 
их деятельности.  Такое понимание – залог выстраивания опти-
мальных отношений между исследуемыми объединениями аль-
тернативного православия и  государством.
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Territorial policies within the Orthodox Church may be called 
geoecclesiology. Historically, geopolitics of states and geoecclesiology 
of the Church demonstrated their ability either to be mutually 
supportive and enforcing, or to pursue conflicting goals. It would be an 
oversimplification to see the Orthodox Church as inevitably assisting 
states in their geopolitical enterprises. The situation in Moldova, both 
today and historically, provides an opportunity to see the dynamics 
of geoecclesiastical situation and how it correlates (or not) with the 
current state of geopolitical affairs.
Geoecclesiology in the Republic of Moldova after independence
On 22 October 1991 the Holy Synod declared that the dissipation of 
the country should not entail break of canonical unity and stressed that 
«the borders of the Patriarchate not necessarily should coincide with 
state borders»1. Subsequently partial autonomy within the Moscow 
1 Zayavlenie Svyashchennogo Synoda Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi 22.10.1991. 
Moscowskii Tserkovnyi Vestnik. – 1991. – № 19 [Electronic resourse]. – Mоde of 
access: http://krotov.info/acts/20/1990/shtric_18.htm.
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Patriarchate was granted to Orthodox Churches in Ukraine, Estonia, 
Latvia and Moldova. 
On 8 October 1992 an assembly of the Moldovan clergy decided 
to stay within the Moscow Patriarchate. However, a group of clerics 
decided to separate. To admit them, the Romanian Church proclaimed 
the restoration of its Bessarabian Metropolitanate on the territory 
of Moldova headed by a former ROC bishop Petru (Paduraru). This 
decision contradicts the universally recognized canonical principle 
thаt there must be no administrative structures of one local church 
on the canonical territory of another (also known as «one bishop 
in a city»). Normally, in case there are ethnic communities in need 
of specific liturgical and communication language on the territory 
of a Church, they form specific parishes within its jurisdiction with 
priests speaking the language-in-question. For example, within the 
Georgian Orthodox Church there are parishes with Slavonic liturgy 
and the Russian language for confession. However, the Romanian 
Church preferred not to follow this common pattern of resolving 
ethnolingustic issues.
1994 Thomos of Patriarch Alexii II makes the Moldovan Orthodox 
Church self-governed by its own Sobor (Assembly of clerics and 
laypeople)1. Nevertheless, its decisions are to be ratified by the 
Patriarch of Moscow and the Holy Myrrh is also given by the Moscow 
Patriarchate (the latter designates subordinated position of a recipient 
church). Staying within the jurisdiction of the ROC does not imply that 
the Church of Moldova must use Slavonic for liturgy. In fact, most 
parishes in Moldova are currently using Moldovan (Romanian), or 
Moldovan with Slavonic insets. Slavonic is used in parishes consisting 
of ethnic minorities (Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauzi, etc.). The Moldovan 
Church of the Moscow Patriarchate venerates Romanian saints born 
in Bessarabia. The main difference between a parish of the Moscow 
Patriarchate and a parish of the Metropolitanate of Bessarabia is not 
the language, but the New Calendar and the absence of special prayers 
for Patriarch Kirill. 
In the first years of independence, the leadership of Moldova 
was indifferent to the ecclesiastical conflict. In the end of the 1990s, 
however, the authorities started to decline requests to register the 
Statute of the Metropolitanate of Bessarabia. In 2001 the Communist 
1 Tomos of avtonomii Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi Moldavii, Drevo. An open 
Orthodox encyclopedia, 14 December 2013 [Electronic resourse]. – Mоde of 
access: http://drevo-info.ru/articles/17867.html.
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party came to power and declared that the Moldovan Orthodox 
Church of the Moscow Patriarchate is the only legal successor of all 
the previously existing bishoprics on the territory of Moldova. The 
1993 Statute of the Moldovan Church also indicates that it holds all 
church property including what was built or restored in the period 
of Romanian occupation as a part of the Mission in Transnistria. The 
Metropolitanate of Bessarabia has to build its churches anew.
The Communist government of Moldova understood Romanian 
ecclesiastical expansion as a threat to its own authority. Finally, the 
Metropolitanate of Bessarabia had to appeal to the European Court of 
Human Rights. As a result, the Republic of Moldova was fined for violating 
religious freedom and had to register the Metropolitanate in July 2002.
The new government, that replaced the Communists in 2009, supports 
unification with Romania in the long-run. A vague perspective for political 
unification is compensated by successful building a single cultural 
space for Romania and Moldova. The Romanian Church (as well as in 
1918-40 and 1941-44) became one of the main instruments for spreading 
Romanian cultural influence. It is not, of course, the only instrument. 
Romania contributes a lot into state education system in Moldova (for 
example, ‘History’ textbooks are printed in Romania) and provided for 
2013\14 academic year 5500 stipends for Moldovan students to study at 
Romanian universities and high schools (5000 stipends for the previous 
year). Romanian citizenship and passports are now available for all 
descendants of people, who used to live on the territories occupied by 
Romania independently of their linguistic and ethnic status.
The position of the Metropolitanate of Bessarabia in Moldova is not 
very strong. Ethnic minorities support neither the idea of unification 
with Romania, nor the Metropolitanate. The New Calendar makes the 
Romanian Church unacceptable for the Moldovan monastics and rural 
laity. At the same time, the younger generation – graduates of Romanian 
educational institutions – may rather see themselves parishioners 
of the Romanian Patriarchate. It seems that the Metropolitanate of 
Bessarabia pins most of its hopes on young people. For example, it 
provides ‘Religion’ textbooks for Moldovan schools where religion is 
taught since 2010 (the Moscow Patriarchate was not able to prepare 
such textbooks).
Geoecclesiology in Ukraine and the Transnistrian Moldovan 
Republic
In 1995 the Metropolitan of Bessarabia Petru Paduraru was granted 
a specific title of Exarh al Plaiurilor (virtually: Exarch of the [New] 
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Lands). He has a right to establish new parishes for Romanian Orthodox 
communities existing outside the Republic of Moldova. It is assumed 
that such communities unite ethnic Romanians needing liturgy and 
pastoral assistance in their native language. Since Romania does not 
recognize Moldovans as a separate group (only as a regional subgroup 
of Romanians), this may also mean communities of ethnic Moldovans.
In 2007 Daniel, the Metropolitan of Moldova and Bucovina (meaning, 
Romanian Moldova and Southern Bucovina) was elected as the new 
Patriarch of Romania. His interest in expanding his church eastwards 
on 24 October 2007 resulted in establishing three new bishoprics of 
the Metropolitanate of Bessarabia in Moldova and Ukraine instead of 
those existing in 1918–1940 and 1941–1944:
The Bishopric of Beltsi (to replace the Bishopric of Khotyn); the 
episcopal see is located in Beltsi (Moldova).
The Bishopric of Southern Bessarabia (to replace the Bishopric 
of Belgorod-Dnestrovski); the episcopal see is located in Cantemir 
(Moldova).
The Bishopric of Dubossary and all Transnistria (to replace the 
Mission in Transnistria); the episcopal see is theoretically located in 
Dubossary (the self-proclaimed Transnistrian Moldovan Republic).
Petru Paduraru expressed a hope that in a favorable time the sees 
of the new bishoprics would move to the proper Ukrainian cities 
(Khotyn, Izmail and Belgorod-Dniestrovski) and that their location in 
Moldova is provisional1. This was understood by the Russian Orthodox 
Church as intent to violate its canonical territory (namely, the Odessa 
and Chernivtsy Oblasts of Ukraine and the Transnistrian Moldovan 
Republic). The Romanian Church justifies its actions by the fact that 
there are ethnic Romanians living in Ukraine (not to mention the 
Transnistrian Republic) and needing liturgy, confession and spiritual 
guidance in the Romanian language. The Romanian Church refuses to 
consider its activities as violation of canonical territory and insists that 
communities of ethnic Romanians of the former Soviet Union are free 
to choose their canonical jurisdiction independently2. 
1 V «Bessarabskoi mitropolii» zayavliaut o namerenii rasprostranit’ svoe 
vliyanie na territoriyu Ukrainy, Pravoslavie.Ru,  5 November 2007 [Electronic 
resourse]. – Mоde of access: http://www.pravoslavie.ru/news/24699.htm.
2 «Bessarabskaya mitropoliya» obvinila RPTs v rumynofobii I pokushenii 
na territorial’nuyu tselostnost’ Moldavii’, Regnum. Ru, 28 July 2011[Electronic 
resuorse]. – Made of access:  www.regnum.ru/news/1429800.html.
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Cultural and political situation in the Ukrainian regions with a 
significant number of ethnic Romanians\Moldovans seems different 
(See Table 1). Historical Boudjak – the Odessa Oblast – was never part of 
Romania and stayed much longer under the Soviet rule than Northern 
Bucovina. The local Moldovan population mostly distinguishes itself 
from the Romanians as an ethnic group. As a result, the number of 
those who identify themselves as Romanians here is about 700 people 
(in 2001)1. As for historical Bucovina (the Chernivtsi Oblast), much 
more people here identify themselves as ethnic Romanians, claim 
Romanian passports and send their children to Romanian universities. 
Romanian consulate in Chernivtsi is unofficially reported to give 
away 100 thousand Romanian passports to Ukrainian citizens, but no 
reliable data is available (double citizenship is forbidden in Ukraine).
Source: ‘Chislennost i sostav naseleniya Ukrainy po itogam 
Vseukrainskoi perepisi naseleniya 2001 goda’, Gosudarstvernnyi 
komitet statistiki Ukrainy, 15 January 2014, http://2001.ukrcensus.
gov.ua/rus/results/general/nationality/.
In the Chernivtsi Oblast there is a slight increase in the percentage 
of ethnic Romanians with subsequent decline of the number of ethnic 
Moldovans. Most likely, people simply change their self-identification: 
some of those calling themselves Moldovans in the Soviet time, 
switched to Romanian identity, providing thus extra 14,2 % of ethnic 
Romanians, as indicated in тable 1.
While the number of ethnic Romanians in the Chernivtsi Oblast 
grows, no parishes of the Metropolitanate of Bessarabia are reported 
to exist there. Romanian cultural influence is spread not with the 
help of ecclesiastical bodies, but via cultural societies, educational 
opportunities for the youth, etc. The needs of Romanian parishes are 
satisfied in a canonically approved way: they are using the Romanian 
language for liturgy and everyday communication. What may also 
have impact is that Northern Bucovina since 1928 was part of the 
Metropolitanate of Bucovina, not of Bessarabia.
1 MID Rumynii: v Odesskoi oblasti grubo assimiliruyut rumyn, a 
rumynskie tserkvi zdes redkost’, Religiya v Ukraini, 7 February 2011 
[Electronic resourse]. – Mоde of access:  http://www.religion.in.ua/news/
vazhlivo/8192-mid-rumynii-v-odesskoj-oblasti-grubo-assimiliruyut-
rumyn-a-rumynskie-cerkvi-zdes-redkost.html.
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Table 1
 Ethnic Moldovans and Romanians in Ukraine in accordance with the 
2001 census (the only one ever held)
 Republic of Ukraine
Absolute 
number
2001, % 1989, % 2001\1989 
ratio, %
Moldovans 258,6 0,5 0,6 79,7
Romanians 151,0 0,3 0,3 112,0
Odessa Oblast (Boudjak)
Moldovans 123,7 5,0 5,5 85,6
Romanians no data no data no data no data
Chernivtsi Oblast (Northern Bucovina)
Moldovans 67,2 7,3 9,0 79,5
Romanians 114,6 12,5 10,7 114,2
In the Odessa Oblast, where few people identify themselves as 
ethnic Romanians, the Church became the primary tool for spreading 
Romanian cultural influence. In 2014 two parishes belonging to the 
Metropolitanate of Bessarabia are reported to exist in this region. In 
2003 the first Romanian «autonomous parish» of Sts. Peter and Paul 
was registered in the village of Kamyshovka (Izmail region, Odessa 
Oblast), mostly populated by ethnic Moldovans and called Hagi 
Curda before 1947.  On 16 July 2011 Petru Paduraru consecrated a 
church for this parish, now coexisting with a church of Sts Peter and 
Paul belonging to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow 
Patriarchate in the same village. An unregistered Romanian parish 
also exists in a Moldovan village of Utkonosovka (Erdek-Burnu).
The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate 
perceives the emergence of Romanian parishes on its canonical 
territory not as an issue between Churches, but as a geopolitical 
challenge to be responded by state authorities1. For example, 
responding the foundation of the parish in Kamyshovka, Agaphangel, 
the Metropolitan of Odessa and Izmail, sent a letter to the president of 
Moldova Vladimir Voronin, asking him to call back the registration of 
1 Stratulat, N. Pravoslavnaya Tserkov v Moldavii v kontekste istorii 
moldavsko-rumynskikh tserkovnykh otnoshenii v XX veke / N.  Stratulat. – 
Sankt-Peterburg, 2010. – P. 250.
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the Bessarabian Metropolitanate. In 2008 Onuphrios, the Metropolitan 
of Chernovtzy and Bucovina, addressed Voronin with a similar request.
The Ukrainian state also considers Romanian influence on its 
territories a geopolitical threat, although not very urgent. Romania 
never expressed official territorial claims on Bucovina or Boudjak. 
However, it already initiated a territorial dispute with Ukraine about 
the Zmeinyi Island (Serpent Island) in the Black see and delimitation 
of continental shelf. In 2004 this case was presented by Romania to 
the International Court of Justice. Having this in mind, the Ukrainian 
leadership cannot help remaining vigilant about possible Romanian 
complaints in the future.
The Romanian Bishopric of Dubossary exists only on paper. 
Establishing a special ecclesiastical unit for Transnistria was 
perceived in the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic as a threat to 
state security. A diocesan assembly immediately condemned it as 
an attempt of the Romanian authorities to separate the Orthodox on 
the basis of their language and blood1. Since the government of the 
self-proclaimed republic prevents any Romanian presence on its 
territory, Romanian cultural and ecclesiastical influence in the self-
proclaimed state is slightly above zero (except 6 Romanian schools). 
The ecclesiastical authorities of Transnistria firmly remain true to 
the Moscow Patriarchate and even the ruling bishop (contrary to the 
Thomos) is appointed by the Patriarch of Moscow. This situation is 
fully in accordance with geopolitical choice of the self-proclaimed 
Transnistrian Republic to stay within Russian sphere of influence.
Conclusion
So far, the attempts to bring the geoecclesiastical conflict to its 
end were not successful. Failing negotiations, most likely, indicate 
that this debate over canonical territories has a strong geopolitical 
underpinning. The Romanian Orthodox Church acts as one of the 
instruments for building common cultural space for Romania and 
Moldova where Romania would dominate. As a result, belonging to 
the Romanian Church seems to predetermine the political position of a 
believer.  Vice versa, those remaining within the Moscow Patriarchate 
are expected to share pro-Russian political stand and to be in Russian 
sphere of influence. However, geoecclesiastical reality not necessarily 
repeats the geopolitical disposition. For example, relations between 
the Churches of Russia and Georgia remained friendly even in during 
the 2008 armed conflict between the two states. Moldova represents 
1 Ibid. – P. 253.
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an opposite example: here geoecclesiology and geopolitics overlap so 
much that become virtually indivisible. 
 
ВЗАИМООТНОШЕНИЕ В УКРАИНСКОМ ПРАВОСЛАВИИ 
В УСЛОВИЯХ СОЦИАЛЬНОǧПОЛИТИЧЕСКОГО КРИЗИСА: 
РОВЕНСКИЙ МЕМОРАНДУМ
Ю. В. Линник
Ровно, Украина
Постановка проблемы в общем виде и ее взаимосвязь с важ-
ными научными и практическими задачами. На современном 
этапе своего существования Украина столкнулась с новыми про-
блемами окружающего мира: экономический и политический 
кризис, рост цен на продукты питания и жилищно-коммунально-
го хозяйства, необъявленная война на Востоке страны, которые 
заводят в тупик развитие Украины. Общество, которое устало от 
политических баталий и обещаний, хочет мира и стабильности. 
Люди ищут защитника в лице церкви. Этот религиозный инсти-
тут держит уровень доверия на высоте – почти 70 % (по данным 
КМИС – Киевского международного института социологии на 
февраль – июнь 2013 г.), несмотря на достаточно непростую си-
туацию и внутри самой церкви. Проблемой религиозной среды 
в стране является раскол православной церкви. Дело в том, что 
в Украине нету единой поместной церкви, а среди трех право-
славных конфессий – УПЦ МП (Украинская православная церковь 
Московский патриархат), УПЦ КП (Украинская православная цер-
ковь Киевский патриархат) и УАПЦ (Украинская автокефальная 
православная церковь) отсутствует единое понимание получе-
ния автокефалии, и как следствие, каждая выдвигает свои ус-
ловия. Этот процесс длится уже более 22 лет и, увы, не принес 
положительных результатов. Политики пытаются использовать 
церковь в своих целях, таких так завоевание власти, путем при-
влечения верующих, симпатизирующих определенной конфес-
сии. Например, на президентских выборах 1994 года – Л. Кравчук 
проявлял лояльность к УПЦ КП (впрочем, он это делал и раньше), 
а Л. Кучма – УПЦ МП, что говорит о достаточно выраженной во-
влеченности церкви на Украине в политический процесс.
Если мы вспомним, что религиозная жизнь на Украине 
в 90-х гг. ХХ в. характеризовалась захватом храмов, то в 2014 г. 
есть случаи перехода из одной юрисдикции в другую (из УПЦ 
МП в УПЦ КП) на добровольной основе. Особенно заметны тен-
